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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, public awareness has been developing
in relation to the public health risk
pollution.

from indoor

air

Most people spend about 90% of their time indoors

and, as homes and offices have become more tightly sealed,
pollutants become trapped with the result that toxic risk
levels are intensified.
One of the more serious of these pollutants is radon
gas, found in the natural environment, particularly
certain rock formations.

near

Indoors, the gas breaks down into

short-lived radionuclides called radon daughters which, when
breathed over a period of time, increase the risk of lung
cancer.
This paper

begins with

a case study about

the

discovery of above risk-level indoor radon in buildings in
Butte, Montana and the efforts of the state of Montana to
study and determine the extent of the problem.

It goes on to

describe the development of federal involvement which ranged
from that of an investigative ally to an intrusive regulator.
The paper explores some of the literature relating to the
assumption of cancer risk from elevated indoor radon levels
and the growing media attention to the potential of indoor
air pollution as an individual and public health problem.
The final section broadens the public policy context
by examining recent Congressional and Administration action

1

and inaction relating to indoor air pollution in general and
radon in particular.

Governmental options regarding this

serious public heath threat are reviewed and projected within
the current political climate.
Throughout the

p a p e r , we s e e the complexity of

factors affecting incentives and barriers to governmental
action.

The central focus on public policy implications

relating to the indoor radon problem in Butte covers seven
years and is still without a definitive solution.
One of the major influences over this seven

year

period has been the widely divergent philosophy regarding the
role of the federal government of the Carter

and

Reagan

Administrations.
The Carter Administration took its role of protecting
the public welfare seriously.

The Reagan Administration

perceives much of the federal government's previous strong
role as unnecessary and undesirable. This Administration's
"New Federalism" policy is that of persistent attempts to
diminish

and

dismantle

the

size,

structure

responsibilities of many federal functions that had

and
been

designated to be in the national interest.
The environmentally conscious Carter Administration
sought and achieved quick action to protect the public health
from environmental hazards.

The role of government as an

intervenor and that of a positive force for the public good
was acceptable.

This political philosophy underlies

2

the

decision making processes in the earlier stages of the case
study.

When early data indicated a public health risk, the

D e p a r t m e n t of

Housing

and

Urban Development

acted

expeditiously with a non-traditional decision making process.
Career employees and high-level political appointees were
free to use the means to justify the end if the decision was
in the public interest.
In contrast, under the current

Administration,

official barriers at the highest levels have substantially
slowed down, but not totally blocked, agency activity in
r e s e a r c h and

in

developing solutions for

pollution, particularly radon.

indoor air

The skillful, committed

bureaucrat, who wants to make some progress in delivering
solutions to the problem, may

continue to achieve s o m e

r e s u l t s , but more with counterparts, and

through the

circumspect cultivation and development of Congressional
action and media awareness than officially through Agency and
Administration policy.
Meanwhile, Congressional attention to the issue is
developing, but countervailing pressures will probably deter
any major decisions that require funding in the near future.
In the current climate of deep immersion and preoccupation
with budget battles, just maintaining many vital programs and
protecting them from extermination is considered progress.

3

BUTTE, AMERICA AND RADON

B u t t e , America:
world!

"The biggest mining camp in the

"A mile high and a mile deep!"

"The richest hill on

e a r t h ! " U n d e r the city twisted 2,700 miles of tunnels, and
in their dim hot depths thousands of men worked and fought
2
and died."
Today, the mines are shut down and the town is in
chronic depression.
and frequent deaths.
ran the

Forty years ago there were many cripples
The Anaconda Company, which owned and

mines, and the unions, tried to elevate safety

standards.

But rock dust still "filled the miners' lungs and

suphuric acid dripped from the walls of drifts, burning their
clothing and flesh."

The city's file of death certificates

provided the tragic coda for the dramatic song of Butte:
"Occupation, miner; cause of death, silicosis; was deceased's
occupation responsible?
I n the early
officials asked

3

Yes."

twenties, Federal Bureau of

Mines

Butte workers to check in for silicosis

tests; forty-two percent of the 1,018 who volunteered to be
examined had silicosis--"miner's con."

Health and safety

improvements later brought the "wet drill" and vastly better
ventilation.

T h e Company claimed

virtually non-existent.

that silicosis was

Yet men continued to die of many

pulmonary disorders, including silicosis, and Silver Bow
County, populated mostly by the citizens of Butte, had ten

4

percent of the state's population and twenty-five percent of
4

the tuberculosis deaths.

Butte began in 1864 as a gold mining camp.

During the

past 100 years, more than 200 mines have operated in the
Butte area.

"These mines have honeycombed the Butte hill

with shafts and tunnels and have littered the surface with
mine wastes.

Subsidence resulting from underground mining is

an ongoing phenomenon as the hill area continues to settle
and shift." 3
In 1955, mining operations shifted from underground to
open pit mining as the Anaconda Company began stripping and
burrowing into the Berkeley Pit.
abandoned underground mining.

By 1975, the company had
In the late 1970's, Atlantic

Richfield (ARCO) acquired the Anaconda Company and continued
Berkeley Pit operations until July, 1982.

In early 1983,

ARCO announced that Butte mining operations would terminate
on July

1,

1 983.

It was cheaper to import copper from

abroad.^
Geological Underpinnings
Butte's geology underpins
sometimes dangerous mining
Boulder Batholith, a mass of

its

history.

l o n g , r i c h , and
Butte lies in the

granitic rock.

As it w a s

created, the crust was subject to outside pressures.

Stress

fields solidified during the cooling causing faults and
fissures, or breaks in the rocks.

Within these faults flowed

7
many hot liquids which later became mineral deposits.
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The Butte mineral deposit is ranked as world class.
From 1880 to 1964, enough ore was mined to produce more than
16 billion pounds of copper, more than 4 billion pounds of
zinc, 3 billion pounds of maganese, 699 million ounces of
O
silver and 2-1/2 million ounces of gold.
In the past seven years, the tough, stoic citizens of
Butte h a v e learned of another potentially deadly hazard
invading their lives and their lungs.

This time, radon gas,

invisible and odorless, was discovered drifting into the
privacy of the miners' homes.
Radon is produced by the decay of uranium 238, a trace
element in the earth's crust.
the air.

Outdoors, it disperses into

Indoors, it decays into other radioactive elements

called daughters, that bind to dust particulates.

When

inhaled into the lungs, the radon daughters can cause cancer.
Researchers have recently estimated that 2,000 to 2 0 , 0 0 0
cases of lung cancer in the U.S. each year may be caused
solely by indoor radon pollution.

g

Radon Discovered Accidentally
The presence
accidentally

in

of

1977

radioactivity
by

Larry

was

Lloyd,

discovered

chief of

the

Occupational Health Bureau of the Montana Department of
Health and Environmental Sciences.

As he was driving into

Butte to investigate the health implications of phosphate
slags at the Stauffer

Chemical Company, Lloyd had his

scintillator, a radiation measuring device, sitting on the

6

seat

b e s i d e him.

Approaching one area

scintillator "went off

the wall" and

of Butte, the

as he neared

an

10
outcropping, it "went nuts."
The Montana Department of Health and Environmental
Sciences (DHES) then initiated an investigation into the use
of phosphate slag in the Butte and Anaconda areas.

Phosphate

slag is a byproduct of an elemental phosphorus smelter about
seven miles west of Butte.

It had been used extensively

throughout the city in construction.
as a ballast in railroad

beds and

It was found not only

in road and highway,

parking lot and playground construction, but used in concrete
blocks and pre-stressed concrete beams and slabs in building
materials for homes and schools.

11

The use of phosphate slag was of concern because it
had a high level of natural radioactivity, particularly
radium-226.

As the investigation proceeded, DHES discovered

elevated radon and radon progency concentrations in buildings
in Butte.

The cause was unknown.

12

EPA Becomes Involved
In November, 1977, Montana notified the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in Denver and requested assistance.
The following April, in 1978, EPA sent a van equipped with a
large collimated gamma scintillation detector.

Staff from

DHES and the Office of Radiation Programs of EPA conducted a
gamma scanning survey with the van and identified about 750
locations having elevated

levels of radioactivity.

7

By

September, this information was further refined with indoor
surveys and

many

homes

with

concentrations were identified.

high

radon

progency

13
J

The State of Montana continued its investigation in
what was thought to be a responsible and prudent manner.
Governor Thomas L. Judge found some funds to begin a

program

"to determine the magnitude of the radiation problem, assess
health risks and initiate necessary measures to protect the
health

and welfare of the people."

The 1979 Montana

Legislature appropriated $100,000 to DHES for a 2-year study
to determine what was responsible for the elevated radon
levels.

14

In April, 1979, informal discussions concerning the
early data of the initial 1978 survey were going on in the
Denver federal regional offices between EPA staff and the
environmental staff of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD).

Montana's request for EPA assistance in

what was thought to be a methodical state effort to identify
and

assess the problem was stirring up high concern in

Denver.

Gerald Hannon, Deputy Director to the Regional

Administrator of HUD was becoming particularly alarmed about
the findings.

15

Back in Butte, an editorial in the June 11 edition of
the Montana Standard stated that:

"Checks of homes built

with, and without, slag building materials, however, produced
elevated readings in some of the non-slag homes, too.

8

State

health technicians speculate that natural radiation sources
are responsible for some of the readings, but they stress
that more checking is

needed

before they can draw firm

conclusions.
Increasing numbers of Butte residents have begun to
refuse the team permission to monitor their homes lately,
especially s i n c e CBS-TV
situation.

televised a piece on the local

When the study is complete and the data carefully

examined, the health people will be able to tell us what it
all means and what remedial action might be taken.

The best

thing now is to cooperate with the study and not get overly
excited about these early radiation findings.

About the only

conclusion that can be drawn so far from the state health
team's study of Butte's elevated radiation levels is that one
shouldn't jump to conclusions."

16

Three days later, on June 14, the radioactive perils
of

B u t t e , Montana, hit the New York

Times.

The lead

paragraph theorized that "Butte sits on top of a honeycomb of
old copper mines, and the mines are apparently acting as
collectors of radon gas and its cancer-causing offspring,
known

as radon daughters."

But Paul Smith and other

officials of the EPA "emphasized that the radon-collecting
tunnels theory was just that."

It just seemed "the most

logical explanation for the scattered pattern of 'hot' houses
in Butte."

Larry Lloyd, who was systematically proceeding

9

with his research, "was considerably put off by a CBS News
report on the situation that he considered alarmist."

17

Lung Cancer Threat
By this time, Lloyd had studied about 300 houses in
Butte and found that those in the Northwest section, known as
on the "Hill", under which lay most of the underground mines,
had the highest levels of radiation.

For the first time, on

June 14, the cancer threat was revealed in stories in both
the New York Times and the Montana Standard.

EPA's Smith

said that "studies in Florida have shown that with normal
background radiation levels, it can be expected there will be
3,000 cancer deaths per

100,000 population over a lifetime.

But, when background radiation levels reach the EPA standard
of 0.02, working levels (WL), the number of cancer deaths can
be expected to jump by about 2,000 to 5,000."

18

And the New

York Times said that Butte's lung cancer rate is 54.3 deaths
per 100,000 population.
national rate is 35.3.

The state rate is 30.1

and the

19

On July 26, 1979, Governor Thomas L. Judge wrote to
Douglas Costle, Administrator of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, in support of a grant to the State of
Montana for $71,075 to add one full-time employee to assist
20
with the study for fiscal years 1980 and 1981.
Judge stated that:

"When the budget was established,

it was believed that the increased radioactivity levels found
in several Butte homes were due to the widespread use of

10

phosphate slag in building and roadway construction.
that time, the following has been found:

(1)

Since

Elevated

levels of radon daughter concentrations in Butte area homes
are much more widespread than previously imagined; (2) the
use of the phosphate slag
increased radioactivity

is not responsible f o r

the

in the affected homes; and ( 3 )

ambient radon and radon daughter concentrations are elevated
during some meteorological conditions.
Because the scope of the Butte environment radiation
study has expanded to such a large extent, the additional
employee is necessary to bring the study to a timely and
satisfactory conclusion," Judge concluded.

21

HUD Moves on Butte
Meanwhile, in Denver, a HUD Task Force was developing
procedures for Radon Progency Screening which involved
discussions with EPA and DHES.

Included in the preparations

was a planned award of a $65,000 Community Development Block
22
Grant to Montana for technical assistance.
On August

15, Hannon, the spearhead

of H U D ' s

involvement in Butte, memoed Alan Kappler, a member of the
HUD Environmental Task Force in Washington, D.C.

This high-

level Task Force was chaired by the Under Secretary, then Jay
Janis, second in command to HUD's Secretary Patricia Harris.
Other members included the Assistant Secretaries and Regional
Administrators.

23

11

The memo described the problem and HUD's funding and
insurance programs for fiscal year 1979.
f o r t h the testing system to

be used

Attachments set
by the state for

measuring the amount of radon daughters inside homes.

The

$65,000 technical assistance grant was being negotiated with
the state and all HUD contracts were to be amended.

The memo

concluded that "Although the above process and procedures are
out of pattern with the Department's standard operating
procedures, they are essential due to the imminent health
24
hazard discovered in Butte and Anaconda."
What was "out of pattern?"

What was unusual was the

decision that was made and the manner in which it was done.
HUD has a mandate to insure that all HUD-assisted projects
are located in a safe and healthful environment.

Hannon,

having access to preliminary data from EPA, pressed for a
decision that the regional administrator, Betty Miller,
recommend to the HUD Environmental Task Force that testing be
required for indoor radon for all HUD-assisted projects or
loans in Butte.

The Task Force approved and implementation

25
proceeded quickly, all within just a few weeks.
T h i s was during the Carter Administration and the
political climate of the times was one of high environmental
concern and protection.

The Carter Administration perceived

its role as getting involved, setting policy and intervening
if necessary

to protect the best interests of citizens.

Because of the

political

m a n d a t e and

12

environmental

"urgencies," this Task F o r c e did not follow the normal
decision-making process of the agency

which was a

more

thorough consideration and analysis of data and options
through several staff levels.

After Pat Harris left the

Secretary's position, the Task Force was phased out.

26

This model of decision making was expeditious, but was
it fair and equitable?

Was it based on sufficient data,

analysis and consultation?
There were early

i n d i c a t i o n s that there was a

significant problem in some houses.
a c c e l e r a t e d radon risk levels in

The high incidence of
B u t t e , accidentally

discovered, was unique at the time and

decision makers

accordingly thought the situation merited special protection
for its citizens, even before a thorough study was completed.
Radon is everywhere in the natural environment.
areas also have high risk levels?
welfare of the rest of the

Didn't other

Didn't the health and

country matter?

Aren't all

citizens of the United States entitled to equal protection
under the law?

Yes, but locating, assessing and remediating

toxic risk problems is a long, complicated and
process.

arduous

Even more difficult is ascertaining private and

governmental responsibility.
John Giedt, with EPA in Denver, said that HUD, as a
"prudent administrator" needed to make this decision just
because they k n e w "that Butte might have an accelerated
incidence of radon.

As an insurer, if a home had a high

13

radon reading, HUD might be left holding unsafe property if
not protected by the testing requirement."

But now, Giedt

agrees that "it's so unfair to single out Butte and not be
27
able to give them a solution."

John Endres, who, in 1979,

was special assistant to HUD's Regional Administrator in
Denver, now says, that "at the time it was a good decision.
It was made at a time which predated setting up procedures.
But now, Butte is out there all by itself."

28

With no local input and very incomplete information as
to the specifics or extent of the

potential radiation

problem, HUD on September 13, 1979, precipitiously announced
a clamp on "all current HUD funds for public housing and
future private housing insurance loans by FHA unless homes
are tested for radiation levels."
ruling.

John Endres announced the

"It's HUD's policy to protect the individual home

buyer's health and welfare when using HUD money for Federal
Housing Administration loans or living in a public housing
project funded by HUD," Endres said.

"If a home or housing

unit is above 0.02 working levels of radiation, the loan will
be denied.

HUD will provide the state health department with

a $65,000 grant to hire two persons to conduct tests for
public housing.

But sellers seeking FHA loans for private

29
sale must pay $52 to cover the costs of the tests."
Butte Reacts in Shock and Dismay
The reaction in Butte to the sudden announcement was
basically that of shock and dismay.

14

Gladys Barry, Anaconda

Housing Authority Director, said the ruling came "like a bolt
out of the blue."

Chief Executive Don Peoples said, "What

bothers me is that the EPA has no conclusive evidence there's
a health hazard here.

We're caught in a squeeze between HUD

and EPA." 3 0
Betty Kissock of Kissock Realty r e a c t e d , "It's a
typical bureaucracy.

I don't see why the same standards

couldn't be set up across the country instead of just Butte
and Anaconda."
angry.

Kissock went on to say "People are really

I think we'd better get to the bottom of the charges

and find out how much radiation is here before HUD can issue
statements like that."

Louise Wulf of Wulf Realty said it

even more strongly.

"I think it's an awful kick.

It's

31
cutting our throats."
Perhaps the most cynical response of all came from
State Representative Bob Pavlovich and Pat Kinney, Executive
Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce when they "agreed
over beers at Mr. Pavlovich's Met Tavern that the
problem was overexcited

environmentalists.

basic

It was the

consensus among the tavern patrons that "environmentalists
32
were a greater hazard than radiation."
The congressional delegation, Senators Baucus, Melcher
and

Representative Williams wrote asking for immediate

testing of the area by EPA "because there does not appear to
have been adequate public input prior to the HUD decision and
because the decision on HUD loans can affect the availability

15

of any housing money."

Melcher told the Montana Standard,

"My feeling is there is probably a lot of the area that does
not have the radon gas.

I think they should

identify the

specific houses they are claiming to have high radiation
levels and provide rehabilitation for those homes."
EPA

Chief Costle replied

to Governor

33

J u d g e on

September 26, 1979, reviewing the cooperative efforts of the
past two years between EPA and DHES.

He suggested exploring

further assistance to Montana with the requested funding in
the form of a contractual agreement between DHES and EPA's
Office of Radiation Programs.

Under such an arrangement, EPA

would receive a report of the radiological data.

34

An

extensive 3-year study ensued which was released in July,
1983.

The original grant was to be for $81,804, but the

35
final estimated cost was close to a million dollars.
Inspection procedures officially began on September
17, 1979.

The Montana Department of Health and Environmental

Sciences, in conjunction with the EPA,

developed and

furnished to HUD a radiation survey protocol which defined
the criteria and methodology of the tests.
set.

Two criteria were

One was the 0.02 weighted indoor working level "that

the Administrator of EPA had found as the acceptable level in
terms of the increasing long term risk of lung cancer in the
exposed population."

Also, if a weighted indoor working

level measurement exceeded 0.015 WL, an additional set of

16

measurements

was

to

be

made

on

another

day

for

verification.
Betty Miller, HUD Regional Administrator, in a speech
to the Montana Realtors on October 5, defended HUD's action.
She said that as a result of discussions with EPA, they
became convinced that HUD
problem."

"could not simply ignore the

She also recognized the uncertainties of having no

national standard for exposure limits, no clear understanding
of the source or sources of the radon gas and the lack of
knowledge of the location and number of homes with excessive
levels of radiation.

But, she said that if HUD were to take

no action, they "might be placing a family in a potentially
hazardous situation when it had every right to expect that
HUD would do everything possible to be sure that its home was
37

both physically sound and healthful to live in."
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I

BUTTE RADON PATTERNS STUDIED

In October, EPA scheduled a two day helicopter flyover
survey for taking air samples to identify areas of high radon
levels.

According to Lloyd, this project became a costly

$100,000 failure.

The flight did not have adequate equipment

to detect radiation patterns and therefore the data couldn't
be analyzed.

"They flew too high and too fast.

disaster before they even got there." Lloyd said.

It was a

1

During 1980, Lloyd went on with his EPA and Montanafunded study and the HUD-required testing.

The study was

redirected because it was not clear that slag was the source
of radon.

In fact, a number of structures were found to have

higher radon progeny concentrations than buildings containing
slag.

Since Butte had extensive disturbances to its surface

and subsurface geology because of the underground and surface
mining, it was suspected that this, in conjunction with the
subsidence and natural geologic fault zones, could be the
causes of the high radon levels.

Several thousand homes were

2
to be investigated in the redirected study.
Two

main tasks were identified.

The first was to

measure radon progeny inside and outside buildings in order
to

try

to

pinpoint

concentrations.

the

source

of

elevated

radon

The other task was to place about 200 alpha

track detectors on a grid basis in the soil to determine
radon soil gas concentrations.

3
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A "grab sample" testing process, which took less than
ten minutes, was used in homes.

The most severely impacted

area was "The Hill," where occupants were contacted on a
house-to-house basis and asked for permission to measure
radon progeny concentrations.

The news media gave the

radiation study considerable publicity, and many homeowners
became aware of potential health risks and asked that their
4
homes be tested.
Structures selected for testing were chosen because
they contained phosphate slag building materials, were
located in

areas known

to

be elevated in indoor radon

concentrations, were requested by individuals because of
health concerns, or were required to be tested by HUD or FHA.
Therefore, the structures selected became a biased sample and
extrapolation of data for any city-wide average was not
possible.

The

grab sample technique was an accurate

measurement at the time of sampling, but could be in error as
a standard for the structure because of seasonal and daily
fluctuations.

Long-term sampling was done in some selected

buildings to estimate average concentrations for a year.
This testing was carried out for about a week every three
5

months.

Many factors seemed to affect the variations found in
radon concentrations.

Such things as ventilation rates in

the structure and radon soil gas concentrations in the soil
next to the buildings were important.
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If a driveway, patio

or sidewalk kept the radon gas from normally escaping into
the air, the gas would be more concentrated and instead be
exhaled into the structure.

The testing required that the

building be closed for a certain length of time before the
test, even though normal activity on a day to day basis would
affect the gas levels.

Open doors and windows, wind speed,

traffic in and out of the building, heating systems, the air
exchange rate and changes in the soil moisture and ground
frost all impacted on concentration levels.^
Adding to the complexity of measuring any stable radon
levels

was

the fact

that

the

Butte

area has severe

atmospheric thermal inversions that trap pollutants,
including radon.

These levels seemed to be the highest at

about 6 a.m. and the lowest about 6 p.m.

7

As the study progressed, it was found that structures
exceeding 0.02 WL were distributed throughout the city but,
again, w e r e mostly in

the northwest section.

Dramatic

increases in levels seemed to occur in buildings built over
mineralized veins or over fractures.

It was believed that

these fractures in the underlying geology act as conduits to
3
bring radon to the earth's surface.
Lloyd Reports to Legislature
Lloyd reported his findings to the Montana Legislature
when it met for its biennial session in 1981.

In a three-day

series on Lloyd's report to the Legislature, the Montana
Standard on February 10, 1981, quoted Lloyd as saying that
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the Legislature's "conservative fiscal mood, combined with
misconceptions about the Butte study, would

make nearly

impossible his quest for additional funding and staff to
study radiation problems elsewhere in the state as well as to
Q
provide the final monitoring and remedial work for Butte."
T h e report

to

the H o u s e

Finance

and

Claims

Subcommittee stated that the original intent of the study to
determine the uses and risks of slag-related radiation and
impose controls was no longer valid as the phosphate slag
"exhales even less radon than native soils in
area."

T h e report

also

examined

determining the cancer risk

the Butte

the difficulty of

factor which

is deduced

by

projecting the increase of lung cancer rates among uranium
miners to the general population that has been exposed to
radon.

But it went on to say "Despite uncertainties in

health effects at relatively low levels of exposure, it is
prudently assumed that living in a home with elevated radon
daughter levels increases an occupant's risk of lung cancer
proportionate to the levels within the structure and the
„
„ 10
number of years of exposure."
On February

12, 1981, the Montana Standard quoted

Lloyd as telling the legislators that "Questions persist
about how to correct the radon daughter levels in homes."
Grab sample measurements in Butte homes tested through
December 31, 1980 showed levels of 0.02 WL in 725 of 2,516
samples and more sophisticated measurements showed levels
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greater than 0.02 WL in 81 homes.
inversions, Butte's air showed

During severe thermal

levels above 0.02 which

complicated the radon source question even further.

Lloyd

said that, in 1979, EPA recommended remedial action in all
cases where the indoor radon level exceeded 0.02 WL. 1 1
HUD came through with a $75,000 grant to draw up a
remedial action plan which was to be contracted out.

Lloyd

asked the Legislature to increase his staff by two as he
didn't "even have the personnel to monitor the contractor."
Lloyd concluded that the Legislature had a "negative attitude
toward

f u r t h e r radon

studies."

He was right.

Legislature would appropriate no more money.

The

12

Public Housing Mitigation
In March, it was announced that Silver Bow Homes, a
public housing project in Butte, would receive a $470,000
grant for a "radon mitigation program that will serve as a
prototype for all government housing in highly mineralized
areas in the United States," according to project director
Paul Quinn.

13

First phases to test remediation methods with

radon monitors in a 13 unit "test building" began in June.
By this time, 35 units were found to have elevated levels and
occupants had been moved out.

14

Fifty-seven of the 225

apartments in the complex were finally found to have exceeded
the 0.02 WL.

The remediation work was actually completed in

1982 by sealing penetrations beneath the apartments and in
the crawl spaces and spraying the undersides of the floors
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with one and a half inches of polyurethane foam.
ventilation stack was also put in from
through the roof of each apartment.

A passive

the crawl space

The remediation effort

was successful as remeasurement of each of the 57 apartments
found that all were by then below the 0.02 WL.

15

Is Lung Cancer Threat Real?
Underlying this entire radon detection, analysis,
regulation and remediation effort was, of course, the threat
of the increased risk of lung cancer.

In June of 1981, the

Air Quality Bureau of DHES released its Montana Air Pollution
Study (MAPS).

This was a major $1.5 million four-year study

of the effects of air pollution on human health in several of
Montana's urban areas.^
The MAPS findings on lung cancer in Butte were far
from conclusive.

Of the twenty-eight Montana counties

studied, Silver Bow had the fourth highest death rate of
cancer of the respiratory system, 54.3 per 100,000 population
as compared with the state rate of 30.1 and the national rate
of 35.5.

Silver Bow County also had death rates higher than

the state average for almost all disease, age and sex
categories.

Of particular interest was that cancer mortality

rates were very high for females of all ages as well
males.

As men

as

were more associated with the risks of a

mining-sme1ting work environment, this

implied

that

pollutants in the non-mining environment might be a cancer
risk factor for females.

17
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Followup interviews were conducted

with as many

surviving relatives of lung cancer decedents as could be
found from three counties, including Silver Bow.

Questions

were asked about the smoking habits of the decedents.

It was

found that a significantly larger number of smokers from
Silver Bow County were found in the lung cancer group than in
a control group that died from other causes.

The conclusion

was

was

that

the unusually

heavy

smoking

such

an

"overwhelming variable" that it could not be isolated in
order to assess other variables such as air
including radon.

pollution--

It had also been found that school children

in Butte and Anaconda had decreased pulmonary function as
ambient (outdoor) air pollution increased and that both
communities had high levels of carcinogenic substances in
ambient air."''®
On August 14, 1981, the Montana Standard announced
that DHES would test new passive measuring devices for EPA
that could be placed in homes for a longer period of time
with cheaper, faster, more accurate measuring results.

By

now, the EPA contract had been extended to $300,000 which, if
added to the $600,000 total from HUD and $100,000 from the
Montana Legislature, would amount to at least

a million

dollar radon daughter search and remediation effort thus
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Remediation Recommendations
Meanwhile, ARIX, a professional corporation

of

engineers, architects and planners, was completing its HUD
contract on remediation recommendations with DHES.
report, Planning and Design for

Its

a Radiation Reduction

Demonstration Project, was released in January of 1981.

It

found that the majority of structures with elevated radon
levels were, again, in the northwest section of Butte and
that the degree of elevated radon progeny concentrations
could be related to the area of exposed soil beneath the
surface.
structure

There were three basic categories of existing
types— full

basement,

basement/crawl space combinations.

crawl

space,

and

Twelve remedial action

plans were presented based on previous projects in the United
States and Canada.

These included detailed techniques for

sealing radon entry routes, subfloor ventilation of concrete
slabs, crawl space ventilation and structure ventilation.
assure sound statistical evaluation for

To

a demonstration

project, it was recommended that each of the twelve designs
be repeated 3 times for a total of 36 structures.

The

techniques developed were based on cost-effectiveness, the
level of maintenance required, energy costs to the homeowner
and performance.^^
The demonstration program

goal

was

to

provide

techniques which could be installed by an ordinary homeowner
or a builder at a reasonable cost.
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Although some of the

plans ranged up to a cost of $3,000, this included labor.
Materials for most of the projects averaged about $500-$600
21
and could be done by the average homeowner.
Monitoring both costs and radiation levels closely at
every stage of the demonstration project would also be
essential to determine the most cost-effective means of
reducing

or

concentrations.

preventing

elevated

radon

daughter

22

By March, Larry Lloyd had submitted a written report.
He found that ARIX had done a good job of assessing structure
types in Butte which are prone to elevated radon daughter
concentrations.

Slab-on-grade construction types could not

be investigated as this building technique is essentially
unused in Butte.

He also noted that it may not be possible

to test remedial

techniques in

new construction as the

depressed economy in Butte had brought the building of new
homes to a standstill.

Lloyd felt that homeowners would not

be very likely to use techniques involving much structural
ventilation because of the

increased energy costs.

He

concluded that any "reputable architecture/engineering firm
should be able to extrapolate the remedial design detail to
site specific locations with little difficulty."

Costs for

the project, in 1982 dollars, were estimated to range from
$145,117

for

twelve

structures

23
structures.
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to $271,317

for
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The second stage of the remediation project, the
demonstration itself was to have been funded by HUD.

But HUD

did not follow through on trying to show homeowners how they
might protect themselves from the radon risk, maintaining
that funding for
available.

the second year

grant was no

longer

The demonstration grant proposal was later

24
submitted to EPA.
HUD Pressed to Rescind
In 1983, events

began pressing for

some action.

Lloyd's comprehensive study evaluating radon sources and
phosphate slag in Butte was published in June.

It concluded

that ambient air, soils and surface geology all contributed
to the indoor radon problem.

As expected, homes built over

major fractures or mineralized veins were the most severely
affected

and

aplite, quartz monzonite and

contributed to higher rates.

soils

also

Ambient air was also thought to

be a possibly significant source of indoor radon

during

25
certain atmospheric conditions.
The HUD contract to DHES for radon testing for FHA
financing and in public housing was running out on June 30.
Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive Don Peoples wrote to the
Congressional delegation on March 18.

He stated that "in my

view, the real need for this radiation testing has never been
justified.

On June 30, 1983, the State Department of

Health's contract with HUD will cease and we will no longer
have a mechanism with which to comply with regulations.

29

This

means there could be no more FHA loans made on previous loans
nor could Public Housing Assistance programs continue.

This

situation could have disastrous effects on this community.
If conveyance of homes through FHA is precluded, another
crippling blow will be dealt.

In our view there, there is

absolutely no justification for continuation of the testing
policy." 2 ^
Senator Melcher then wrote to HUD Secretary Samuel R.
Pierce, Jr. restating the position of Don Peoples and asking
that the Department "accelerate its review process and remove
27
the requirement for radon testing."
HUD did

not reply.

With the deadline approaching

fast, staff from the offices of Senators Melcher and Baucus
and

Rep. P a t W i l l i a m s called

officials.

for a

meeting with HUD

On June 28, Congressional staff met with Jim

Christopulos, Senior Environmental Engineer, Steve Cooley of
the Housing Division and Pierre Brosseau, Office of Field
Coordination.

Staff stated that it had been two months since

letters had been written asking that the testing requirement
be lifted as Butte had been unfairly singled out.

Any health

hazard had been blown out of proportion, they felt.

The

radon incident was the result of natural phenomenon which had
been there for hundreds of years, and people had been living
there for hundreds of years, they said.
Congressional staff asked for the criteria used to
make the decision to require radon testing in Butte, the
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criteria used to determine the health hazard, a listing of
all other cities in the United States where HUD requires
radon testing for FHA conveyance (the answer was none), a
listing of all other communities in the United States that
had similar radon levels and the reason that HUD didn't
require testing there.

It was strongly recommended that the

test requirement for Butte be dropped or that it be imposed
in other areas with high radon levels such as Maine, Utah and
other mining areas.
Complex HUD Decisionmaking
HUD officials at the meeting advised Congressional
staff

that

the

final

decision

would

be made at the

Secretarial level, after first being signed off at all
program levels.
The press reported again on June 24 that the local
government would have to take over the tests July 1.

The

story quoted Senator Melcher's May 5 letter to Secretary
Pierce and his statement that staffers from his office and
from offices of Rep. Pat Williams and Senator Max Baucus
would meet with "undersecretary level HUD people...at least
we are going to get to talk to the level of people who can
take action." 2 ®
And still, nothing happened.

Congressional staff had

done enough checking by now to learn that Butte was not a
community unique in having elevated radon levels.

In January

of 1984, Senator Melcher wrote another letter to Secretary
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Pierce.

He said that the "Department seemed to be having a

difficult time making a decision on his request to identify
the health hazard of radon in Butte or not interfere with
house sales."

He said, "There is a clear and simple choice.

Either stop unfairly singling

out Butte for

this radon

testing requirement or apply it uniformly and equitably to
every other community in the United States with similar radon
levels and identify the health hazards."

Melcher went on to

cite other areas in the country with identified higher radon
levels where HUD was not requiring the radon test.

He said

he felt the proper way to handle radon problems was through
state

and

local efforts, with federal assistance, of

identification and remediation for homes with elevated radon
29
levels.
In the over five years that HUD required radon testing
for FHA loan approval in Butte, only two out of 425 homes
30
tested have been above the 0.02 WL.

The City-County Health

Officer, Bill Burke, who is responsible for the testing says
it is valid and people don't try to sabotage findings by
opening doors

and windows.
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However, Betty Kissock, a

longtime, leading Butte realtor feels that the test is a
"sham."

She suspects that people do open their windows

because they are under so much pressure and FHA financing is
the only way they can sell a house.

She vehemently continues

to feel it is an imposition and terribly unfair, but says it
does not generally impede sales since would-be buyers are
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simply told it is a requirement and only one or two homes
"3?

have tested above the risk level.
Following the January, 1984, Melcher letter, staff
checked

with Pierre Brousseau in the Office of Field

Coordination of HUD who had been handed the responsibility of
developing
Secretary.

a

decision

abstract on

the issue for the

Preparing a response to the letters from the

Montana Senators, Representatives, Governor and Butte-Silver
Bow Chief Executive had become a complex process.
Normally, all mail from members of Congress is first
routed to the Executive Secretariat office of the Secretary
which assigns it to the appropriate division for response and
monitors its progress.

After staff

have

prepared

a

recommended response, every policy matter is reviewed by
every Assistant Secretary that has an interest in the
issue.^

The Environmental Task Force that initiated the

original radon testing decision had
dissolved.

long

since

been

Therefore, it went back to the basic decision

making process at the division level.
The letters were bounced around at the beginning.
They first went to the Office of Single Family Housing and
then to the Assistant Secretary for Housing.

Housing said it

was an environmental issue and sent it over to the Assistant
Secretary for Community Planning and Development where it
went down to the Office of Environment and Energy.

All of

the division heads reviewed the correspondence, but since it

33

was more of an issue than

they had

originally thought,

34
neither division wanted to take action.
Therefore, it became the responsibility of the Under
Secretary to whom report all of the Assistant Secretaries.
Also reporting to the Under Secretary is the Deputy Under
Secretary for Field Coordination.

Pierre Brousseau, in that

office and responsible for Federal Region VIII, landed the
job of reconciling the contradictory goals, missions and
positions of the two divisions and the Office of General
35
Counsel.
The

Environmental Office felt the testing must

continue because an environmental hazard did exist.

Housing

wanted to drop the requirement as their main goal was housing
<2 £

production and financing.
To

try to

negotiation

resolve the

process

differences, a

evolved.

lengthy

Brousseau

sent

the

correspondence back down to Housing, Environment and the
General Counsel asking their staff to state their positions.
When these came

back, he

put them all together into a

combined document and sent it back down again through all of
the channels.

It

was

obvious

that

there were

many

contradictions, but for the first time, all of the staff
37

involved could see each other's positions on paper.

The negotiation process continued with Brousseau
making four revisions in which everyone involved could see
each other's positions and make written comments.

34

Rewriting was based on comments from the previous
document

and

negotiations.

Brousseau also tried to

accommodate the positions of each group and the environmental
OO
regulations.
Finally in the spring of 1984, principal staff that
had been involved sat down in a conference room for two days
going over the final draft document paragraph by paragraph to
get agreement on language.

A final paper was hammered out as

an abstract to the Secretary giving the background of the
situation with an accompanying decision paper broken down
into various points with a yes, no or comment space.
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Then the paper went back into the final clearance.
Staff made the basic policy decisions and briefed officials
who were

to do the final signoff on the document.

This

included the Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries for
Housing, Community Planning and Development, Congressional
Relations and the General Counsel.

All finally agreed and

the final abstract went to the Secretary in late May or early
June of 1984.

The document was not available to those

outside HUD, but it was unofficially implied that the two
basic points were to drop the testing requirement and to fund
the second phase remediation demonstration program in Butte,
40
for which HUD had claimed to have no money.
About mid-June, when it was known that the Secretary
had had the document for several weeks, a call was made to
Deborah Dean, the Secretary's Executive Assistant.

35

She said

she had put it in front of the Secretary who had delayed
making a decision so she planned to have it brought up at one
of the weekly meetings with the Assistant Secretaries when
the Secretary was in attendance.

Dean fully supported the

decision and she thought that having the five key

high

officials who had signed off on it together at a meeting when
it was considered would encourage the Secretary to sign it.
But
ground and

the Presidential campaign was getting off the
very few policy decisions are made anywhere in

government during an election.

At this point, a decision to

drop the testing requirement might be construed as antienvironmental.

The Reagan Administration seemed sensitive to

such issues in the 1984 election year.

The decision abstract

went back to the Under Secretary's office to wait out the
election.
Right after the election, Brousseau reminded his boss
of the issue.

Shortly thereafter, the decision abstract with

a reminder cover memo went from the Under Secretary back up
to the Secretary.
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Melcher's office also started making a

series of calls to the Executive Secretariat's office and the
office of Congressional Relations.

The response was that the

Secretary was very aware of the problem, and it was a "hot
political issue."
HUD Decides
Finally, in July, 1985, Secretary Pierce replied to
Senator Melcher -- more than a year and a half after the
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Senator's strong request and more than a year after the
Secretary had been

presented with a carefully prepared

decision abstract.
The decision was to rescind the testing requirement
and to jointly

announce, with EPA, a low-cost control

technology demonstration project for 18 homes in Butte.
Residents living in homes testing above risk level might
finally have a solution to protect them from potential lung
cancer risk.

But, before that solution might be available,

it could be close to ten years since Lloyd's initial Butte
42
radon discovery.

37

1

Larry Lloyd, telephone interview, Washington, D.C.to
Helena, Montana, 14 January 1985.

2

L l o y d , Evaluation of Radon Sources and Phosphate
Slag in Butte, Montana, p. 5.
3 Ibid,

p. 6.

^Ibid, p. 16.
^Ibid pp. 16 and 17.
^Ibid, pp. 17 and 18.
7 Ibid,

p. 24.

®Ibid, pp. 39, 43 and 46.
9

"New Funds Doubtful for Radiation Studies," Montana
Standard, 10 February, 1981.
10

"Thermal Inversions Trap Radon Daughters in Butte,"
Montana Standard, 11 February 1981.
11

"It's Low-Level funding vs. High-Level Radon,"
Montana Standard, 12 February, 1981.

13

"Silver Bow Homes a
Standard, 17 March 1981.
14

Radon Test Site, "M o n t a n a

"Tests Started in Homes," Montana Standard, 24 June

1981.
15

L l o y d , Evaluation of Radon Sources and Phosphate
Slag in Butte, Montana, p. 43.
1

f\

Stephen E. Medves, Montana Air Pollution Study (Air
Quality Bureau Environmental Sciences Division, Montana
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences), June, 1981
p. ix.
^Ibid, pp. 100 and 102.
^®Ibid, pp. 108-110.
1Q
"New Devices Sought for Measuring Radon," Montana
Standard, 14 August 1981.
20

ARIX Planning and Design for a Radiation Reduction
Demonstration Project (Report to State of Montana Department

38

of Health and Environmental Sciences) January, 1982 pp. i
and ii.
2 1 Ibid,

p. 4-14.

2 2 Ibid.,

p. 4-17.

23

Larry Lloyd, Evaluation of ARIX Report Entitled
"Planning and Design for a Radiation Reduction Demonstration
P r o j e c t " ( M o n t a n a S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t o~f H e a l t h a n d
Environmental
Sciences), March 1981, pp. 5, 6, 7 and 10.
24
Larry Lloyd, telephone interview, Washington, D.C.
to Helena Montana, 14 January 1985.
25

Larry Lloyd, Evaluation of Radon Sources and
Phosphate Slag in Butte, Montana, p. 74.
26
Donald R. Peoples, Butte-Silver Bow Chief Executive
to Senator John Melcher, March 18, 1983.
27

Senator John Melcher to HUD Secretary Samuel
Pierce, Jr., May 5, 1984.
28
"Quick End Sought for Radiation in Butte Homes,"
Montana Standard, 24 June 1983.
29

Senator John Melcher to HUD Secretary Samuel
Pierce, Jr., 18 January 1984.
•3 n
Chris Kafentzis, Manager, HUD District Office,
telephone interview, Helena to Washington, D.C. 13 February
1985.
31Bill

Burke, telephone interview, Washington, D.C.
to Butte, Montana, 29 January 1985.
3 2 Betty

Kissock, telephone interview, Washington,
D.C. to Butte, Montana, 30 January 1985.
^Interview with Pierre Brousseau, Washington, D.C.,
11 December 1984.
3 4 Ibid.
3 5 Ibid.
3 ^Ibid.
3 7 Ibid.
3 8 Ibid.

39

3 9 Ibid.
4 0 Ibid.

41

Ibid.

42
HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce, Jr., to Senator John
Melcher, July 1985.

40

RADON IN AMERICA:

THE LARGER CONTEXT

Butte and its unresolved indoor radon problem is, at
this point, a dilemma within itself.

But it also reflects

larger questions that remain to be answered, broader national
and international public policy implications that need to be
addressed and solutions that should be available.
Radon Risk and Cigarette Smoking
First, what do we really know about the cancer risk
from indoor radon daughter exposure?

And what is the

relationship, if any, of this exposure to cigarette smoking?
A

May,

1984, report of the

National Council on

Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP, a nonprofit
corporation chartered by Congress in 1964, extensively
reviewed research with animals and uranium miners as related
to radon exposure and the incidence of lung cancer.
concluded

that

"it

is

not

definitely

known

It

if the

extrapolation from the occupational experience to the general
environmental situation is valid."

But it concluded that it

is "consistent with the present radiobiological concept that
lung cancer

induction

is a stochastic process without

threshold."

Smoking, other environmental pollution and

differences in the general population as compared to a small
mining population also complicate the picture.
A

recent summary of research in animal studies

suggested that effects of

inhaled radon daughters were
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similar to results found in human epidemiology.

The major

findings were:
1.

Tumor production at

very high exposures is much

lower than at moderate exposures.
2.

Preliminary evidence shows that long exposures at
lower dose rates produces more lung tumors.

3.

The effect of smoking upon radon daughter induced
cancer is uncertain.

One study showed a lower

lifetime incidence of lung cancer in dogs exposed
to cigarette smoking along with radon daughters
rather than to

radon daughters alone.

It was

tentatively ascribed to the increased mucus
production from smoking.
found in Swedish miners.

2

This effect was also
Other studies have

contradicted this finding.
An extensive study on lung cancer among U.S. uranium
miners found "strong and consistent support for a description
of lung cancer risk as the product of components due to
radiation and to cigarette smoke.

Smokers experienced a

substantially higher radiation-induced risk."

The data

suggested that men who have smoked "twenty pack years" of
cigarettes experience radiation-induced cancer rates that are
roughly five times that of non-smokers.

According to the

study, this strong synergistic effect also prevails among
cigarette smokers who are exposed to asbestos fibers.
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3

But whatever the r?lationship to cigarette smoking,
the

epidemiological

data derived from many types of

underground mining shows a consistent correlation between
exposure to radon daughters and lung cancer incidence.

These

epidemiological studies of humans that have been exposed to
short-lived daughters have been going on for over twenty
years, and it will probably take another twenty years for a
4

complete followup.

As to the possible risk of increased public exposure
in energy efficient homes with low ventilation or in other
homes with elevated levels of radon

daughters,

this

comprehensive NCRP study states there is "insufficient data
5

to evaluate these exposure increases."
A study

by LeTourneau et al, 1983, concluded that

studies in eighteen cities in Canada "could not detect a
relationship between radon daughter concentrations and lung
cancer mortality r a t e s . A n d

a Peking research group

reported on studies of 73,000 people in Guandong Province
where for generations the population had been exposed

to

about double the normal amounts of radon because of monazite
7
deposits with no adverse effects detected.
But

the

general consensus seems to be that it is

possible to estimate that an "arbitrary

increase in the

average exposure of the public might increase lung cancer
rates.
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A June, 1984, headline in the New York Times read "Gas
Emitted by Soil and Buildings Seen as a Cancer Source."

It

quoted an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine as
stating that "radon, a common radioactive gas emitted by
soil, stones and most building materials, may be responsible
for as many as 10,000 lung cancer deaths among nonsmokers in
the United States each year." 9
The editorial was written by Naomi H. Harley, Ph.D.,
Chairman of the Institute of Environmental Medicine at New
York University Medical Center.

She was also Chairman of the

Task Group that prepared the previously cited 164 page report
on "Evaluation of Occupational and Environmental Exposures to
Radon and Radon Daughters in the United States" which also
contained recommendations of the NCRP.
Two new studies related to the issue of smoking and
lung cancer in miners were cited in the editorial.

One study

compared 32 Navajo men in New Mexico who had lung cancer with
that of 64 controls who had died of nonpulmonary cancer.
Twenty three of the lung cancer patients were uranium miners
with median employment of thirteen years.
uncommon

among Navajo Indians.

Of

Smoking is

the twenty three,

information on cigarette smoking was available for twenty
one.

Eight were nonsmokers and median consumption by the

others was one to three cigarettes daily.

The miners with

lung cancer were also an average of 20 years younger at death
than were nonminers with lung cancer.
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The study concluded

that in a rural, nonsmoking population, most of the lung
cancer may be attributable to one hazardous occupation,
.

.

uranium mining.

10

The other study investigated the effect of smoking on
radiation induced cancer with Swedish miners.
were

Fifty deaths

observed as compared with 12.8 expected.

Among

nonsmokers eighteen deaths were observed as compared with 1.8
expected.

In this population with long follow-up, the study

concluded that smoking did not have a "synergistic or
multiplicative effect on the radiation induced cancer risk."
The report indicated that the absolute risk of lung cancer
induced by radon daughter exposure was only slightly higher
for smokers than for nonsmokers.

11

From these two studies, Harley concluded that "unless
some threshold for the production of lung cancer exists, the
risk of lung cancer does not stop at the exit from the mines
and that about one fifth of lung cancer in nonsmokers is due
to the normal lifetime exposure to radon with a lung cancer
risk of fifteen cases per 1000 persons.

On the basis of

average values for environmental exposure and

the lower

estimate of risk, 10,000 people per year may die from lung
cancer related to this source, she concluded."

12

The implications for Butte from these latest studies
are that indoor radon, indeed, may well be responsible for
the high lung cancer death rate, in spite of the heavy
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cigarette smoking of decedents found in the 1981 MAPS study.
Clearly, more research specific to Butte would be helpful.
Exposure Risk Level Study
If we accept the assumption that there is increased
lung cancer risk as a result of radon daughter exposure in
the home, the next questions that arise concern acceptable
risk levels, the extent of the problem and solutions to
protect the public's health.
All exposure measurement has been based on the Working
Level, or WL which is defined as "that concentration of radon
daughters which has a potential alpha energy release of 1.3 x
10(5) MeV per liter of air." 1 ^
Because concerns continue to be raised

about the

potential exposure of the public to radon either from natural
background or redistribution of radioactive materials such as
from granite building products or reclaimed phosphate land,
an in-depth study was done by a scientific committee of the
NCRP.
Published in March, 1984, the report surveyed sources
of radon, assessed levels of exposure, probable distribution
and estimated risks.

It concluded that information on levels

and number of individuals exposed in the U.S. is incomplete.
But the study specifies a level of exposure at which remedial
measures

should

be

taken

C•
4U •
remediation
techniques.
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and

suggests

a variety of

After extensive and comprehensive investigation and
analysis of risk levels of various types of radiation
exposure such as soil, external, inhalation, drinking water
and dietary intake, the report recommended "that an excess
risk of death from lung cancer of two percent or more over a
lifetime for the individual exposed to elevated or enhanced
levels

of radon

daughters should be avoided."

15

The

specified risk level at which remedial action should be taken
for radon daughter inhalation was an annual exposure of 2WLMy
which can be translated to an average WL of 0.04, double the
0.02 WL risk level commonly used and now used in Butte.
The report stated that radon daughter

16

evaluations

require "integrated or extended measurements covering a year
under representative

living

conditions."

17

As

for

remediation, it found that cracks in the concrete basement
walls or basement slabs were the most common source of radon
diffusion into the home.

These cracks could be microscopic

and still be very effective."

18

Indoor Air Pollution Awareness Grows
In the past five or six years, the radon and indoor
air pollution risk potential throughout the country has been
getting increased attention in the scientific and general
print media.

Concern has heightened as buildings have become

more and more energy efficient and reports of high radon
levels sift in from throughout the country.
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The Wall Street Journal in 1979 quoted Jan Stolwijk,
an epidemiologist and member of a World Health Organization
committee, as saying that "There's probably more damage done
to human health by indoor pollution than outdoor pollution."
Until recently, indoor air pollution had not been considered
a serious health hazard because, according to an architect
quoted in the article, most

homes, offices and public

buildings "leaked like a sieve."

Studies of air pollution

inside energy efficient buildings are relatively new in the
United States, even though by 1979, Sweden, Denmark and West
Germany had already issued standards for certain pollutants
and installed remediation measures.
In

early United

States

19
studies,

a government

researcher in Maryland found radon gas concentrations in a
model energy efficient home ten times higher than in a more
typical "leaky" house.

In Texas, researchers measuring radon

emitted from well water found radon gas in the bathroom well
above a risk level.

The Wall Street Journal article further

reported that Charles Hess, a nuclear

physicist at the

University of Maine, believed that natural radiation is even
more dangerous than the risks from the Three-Mile Island
reactor because "people are exposed to it for a lifetime, not
20
just a few days."
In 1 980, the New York Times, in an extensive feature
story, focused on the radiation danger of radon seeping into
homes from stone walls and soil.
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The article appeared near

the end of the environmentally activist Carter Administration
and The Radiation Policy Council in the Executive Office of
the President had asked the Environmental Protection Agency
to prepare a strategy for determining more precisely "the
extent of public exposure to radon and its health effects."
Again, energy efficiency enhanced the awareness of radon
risk.

The article cited the finding that in homes where

rock, especially granite, is used as a reservoir for solar
heat, "air circulated through the rock to heat the house at
21
night can become heavily laden with radon."
The extensiveness of the problem throughout the United
States continued to be unknown.

A survey of nineteen cities

in Canada led to an estimate that ten percent of homes there
have excessive levels and some unacceptably high levels
turned up in twenty-one homes in the metropolitan area of New
York City.

Grand Junction and Durango, Colorado built on top

of or with uranium mill tailings and central Florida, where
about 50,000 acres of land has been reclaimed from phosphate
strip mining, are often cited as having high levels.
Northern New England is another highly radioactive area where
wells penetrate granite.

Radon from the water there escapes

into the air, especially when showers or washing machines are

. 22
used.
By

1981, the more general problem of indoor air

pollution was getting attention from some individuals and
organizations who were concerned with environmental hazards
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and public health.

the National Academy of Sciences, is a

report prepared for the EPA, stated that indoor air pollution
is a "serious and growing problem that can cause discomfort,
illness and even death."
Chairman of the H o u s e

Representative Toby Moffett, then
Energy

and

Natural

Resources

Subcommittee, said that action must be taken to protect the
public from indoor air pollution.

He wrote to Anne Gorsuch,

Administrator of the EPA under the new Reagan Administration,
complaining that the agency was planning to reduce research
on indoor

air

pollution sharply and stating that "Since

Americans spend ninety percent of their time indoors and
scientists have already discovered over a dozen hazardous
substances in ambient indoor air, EPA should
expanding its research effort."

23

instead

be

EPA, under Gorsuch,

appeared more concerned with budget slashing than protecting
the public health and welfare.
was defeated
Connecticut.

in his

bid

A year later, Toby Moffett

to become

U.S. Senator

from

As yet, no other strong spokesman on this issue

has emerged in Congress.
Energy Efficiency Increases Risks
Some research did continue.
General

Electric

Robert Fleischer of the

Research and Development Center

Schenectady, New York, said

in

1981

in

that his studies

indicated that "the elevated levels found in a significant
fraction of energy-efficient homes give exposures to radon
that are equivalent to those that are directly known to
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produce lung cancer in miners with no extrapolation to lower
levels being required."

In a survey of radon levels in 27

homes, 14 of which were considered

"tight" or

energy

efficient, levels were much higher in the tight homes and
shot up to more than four times the acceptable level in the
24
winter, when the homes were closed up.
For several years, there was less attention in the
public press to the radon and indoor air pollution problem.
In 1984, the Wall Street Journal published

an article

comparing the basement home office of a man in Schenectady,
New York, to a uranium mine with 200 times the radon
concentration of an average home.

Radon from the soil around

his water well entered his basement through
dropped sharply after he plugged up the vent.

a

vent.

It

25

By this time, high radon levels had also been found in
areas other than Butte, Colorado and Florida.

Geological

formations in eastern Pennsylvania, parts of New England and
upstate New York all had above risk levels.

The National

Association of Home Builders recognized the problem of indoor
air pollution, but allocated only $12,000 to its research
foundation.^
In Sweden, many homes built over granite and shale
have extremely

high levels

increased

construction for the cold climate.

by energy

tight

There, the government now

sets maximum radon levels for new homes and gives loans and
other assistance for remediation in older homes.
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But in the

United States, the EPA was still ducking.

Although "of

concern," there isn't enough information about risks and
remedy costs to establish specific standards said Gordon
Burley, science advisor to the EPA Office of Radiation
27

Protection.

One of the most significant and comprehensive articles
on the overall issue of indoor air pollution appeared
March, 1983 issue of the Environment magazine.

in the

The author,

Laurence S. Kirsch, is on the advisory board of the National
Indoor Environmental Institute and is an attorney with a

28

background in science and environmental studies.

Kirsch defines indoor air pollution as "pollution that
is found in residential buildings at levels that affect human
health."

He agrees with the view that indoor air pollution

may be an

even greater

pollution.

health threat than outdoor

air

Health effects may be more severe as people spend

most of their time indoors, therefore, exposures are more
29
prolonged and frequent, he says.
Although Kirsch goes into much detail about

the

extent, measurement and generally accepted health risk of
radon, he cautions that "conclusions are at best sketchy, and
those

estimates based

on the mine studies may

be too

pessimistic because radon progeny enter the lungs attached to
dust particles, and dust levels are far lower in homes than
in mines."

But he does accept an EPA statement that radon

exposure inside buildings may account for as many as ten
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percent of all lung cancer deaths in the United States which
•3 n

means an "enormous health effect."

Kirsch also examined

the risk of other indoor pollutants--"combustion products,
formaldehyde, asbestos, chemical fumes and particles are all
potentially dangerous with diverse health effects."^ 1
On January 7, 1985, Newsweek magazine published an
article titled "Sick-Building Syndrome" or "The Deadliest
Pollutants of All May be the Ones You Breath at Home or at
Work."

Now, EPA researchers were quoted as finding that

indoor pollution concentrations are two to five times higher
than outside levels, sometimes over a hundred times higher.
EPA environmental scientist, Lance Wallace, described it as
"We're all living in a chemical soup."

And Newsweek again

raised the radon risk stating that the "clearest danger is
posed

by radon gas."

By now, the extrapolations

and

assumptions have become familiar—that 2,000 to 20,000 cases
of lung cancer each year may be caused solely by indoor radon
pollution.

Anthony Nero of Lawrence Berkely Laboratories,

stated that "There are about a million homes with radon
levels over the recommended standard.

No other environmental
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risk, such as toxic waste dumps, affects that many homes."
And

t h e n , on

April 2 0 , 1 985, CBS evening news

broadcast that the state of Pennsylvania was surveying for
indoor radon levels 22,000 homes in the Reading Prong area of
Eastern Pennsylvania which also extends into New Jersey and
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New York State.

Over half of the homes tested at that point

were found to be above risk level.
A month later, on May 19, the front page of the Sunday
New York Times carried a story with a two column headline,
"Radioactive Gas in Soil Raises Concern in Three-State Area."
The article stated that levels in "some houses were the
highest ever

recorded in the United States."

Radon was

seeping up from uranium deposits in the three-state geologic
formation below.

James Staples, spokesman of the New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection, described

the

situation as "an entirely new area of concern that nobody
even guessed at six months ago."
lived

in the area.

discovered

More than 100,000 people

As in Butte, the high levels were

by accident.

construction of a nuclear

An engineer

working on

the

power plant set off a radiation

alarm when he entered the plant.

His home was later tested
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and his living room showed 16 "working levels of radon."
So if there is, indeed, possibly a critical threat in
some areas, and

larger, more pervasive damage to public

health throughout the United States, not only regarding radon
but indoor air pollution in general, what are the public
policy implications?
done?

What has been done?

What could be

What should be done?
Options for Control
Some people feel that the individual's level of indoor

air quality is his own choice and he should be allowed to
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make his own decisions under free market mechanisms.

Others

view that federal, state and/or local regulation may

be

necessary for products that affect indoor air quality and
still others think that the states and/or local governments
should control indoor air quality.

34

The federal government has shown a broadly based, but
haphazard

interest in

the topic, with at

least eleven

different agencies involved to some extent at one time or
another.

But until recently, Congress hasn't given any

specific direction to the federal government in either indoor
air

research or control.

35

As a

result, the current

statutory and common law mechanisms for dealing with indoor
air pollution and its potential health risks are inadequate
and

u n c e r t a i n ; what

programs there

are "have been

36
contradictory in some cases and redundant in others."
Kirsch considers that federal agencies are not acting
on indoor air pollution for the following reasons:
1.

Regulators have lacked extensive scientific
information on which to base their actions.

2.

Some regulators fear that recognition of an indoor
air pollution problem would increase pressure to
weaken outdoor air quality standards.

3.

Regulators are reluctant to intrude into private
homes.
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4.

Regulators have not shown great concern because
they have not been subject to public pressure to
regulate indoor pollution.

5.

Most importantly, regulators have been reluctant
37
to act without unequivocal statutory authority.

The major federal laws that might be used to regulate
indoor air

pollution are the Clean

Air

Act, the Toxic

Substances Control Act and the Comsumer Product Safety Act.
There are also other federal statutes and state and local
laws that could be used.

The Clean Air Act seems to be the

most obvious law for controlling indoor air pollution.

Its

mandate is broad enough in that it gives the EPA authority to
regulate air pollution in the ambient air so as "to protect
and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as
to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population."

Congress appears not to have

considered the question and therefore did not specifically
include or exclude indoor air when the Act was passed in 1970
or amended in 1977.^
However, EPA has defined its authority as specifically
regulating only outdoor air quality.
Gorsuch had even stated that EPA did

Administrator Anne
not have the legal

authority to do research on indoor air pollution.

There is

one section of the Act that EPA has used for authoritative
action in controlling one indoor pollutant.

This is Section

112 which permits swift regulation for especially dangerous

56

pollutants and EPA has used it to stop spraying of asbestos
insulation and decorative products inside buildings.

39

More specific to radon, the NCRP concludes that there
is "no current legislation that provides any particularly
useful guidance with respect to a workable approach to the
regulation

of

radon

concentrations

in

inhabited

structures.
Besides direct regulation, other forms of government
intervention could include education, common law liability,
voluntary standards and research.

Research is probably the

"least intrusive" form of government action and the lack of
insufficient information about the extent, risks
effective control measures of indoor air

and

pollution is an

obstacle to solving the problem of protecting the public
health.^ ^
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CONGRESSIONAL, ADMINISTRATION, AGENCY ACTION/INACTION

In 1981 and 1982, a small indoor air research effort
was funded by EPA.

Congress passed specific funding

legislation for indoor air research and development by EPA in
the 97th Congress but the entire bill was vetoed by President
Reagan for other reasons.
dollars for indoor
Congress.

However, another two million

air research for 1984 was added

by

On July 12, 1984, the President signed the HUD and

Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984 which again
included two million dollars for indoor air research in 1985
and set up a federal Committee on Indoor Air Quality

co-

chaired by EPA, the Department of Energy and the Consumer
Products Safety Commission.^
The Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality has a
Radon Working Group with representatives from five agencies.
It has issued a draft report and is identifying priorities
for research needs and for policy-making activities.

2

In

March of 1984, the NCRP recommended that, without delay, a
preliminary range-finding survey be taken of 1,000 homes
within 10 of the largest, geographically distributed Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Districts.

The results would

indicate whether a larger scale program would be necessary to
further assess the extent of radon throughout the country.
The Interagency Committee has noted this recommendation and
given it particular importance.
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But the Committee recommends

a national assessment of representative U.S. structures,
appropriately distributed in terms of climate and geology to
identify those areas and conditions where high indoor radon
4

exposures are likely."
In

planning for the federal fiscal year 1986, the

O f fice of Radiation Programs of EPA developed a five year
Radon Assessment and Control Program proposal with a four and
half million dollar cost.

The plan was circulated in October

by the conference of Radiation Control Program Directors to
its state members around the country for review and comment.
The goal of the program was to "have an understanding of the
distribution and levels of radon throughout the United States
and the means available to prevent or ameliorate high levels
of radon."

One of the major information needs cited is the

frequency distribution of individual exposure in "normal"
settings as this "could represent the greatest exposure to
5

the public.

However, the

1986-1990 five year

plan

did

not

successfully make it through the EPA agency budget process
for 1986.

Another $2 million to continue the indoor air

research and demonstration program was retained in the agency
budget but eliminated by the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB). 6
Officially, EPA has paid scant attention to radon in
recent years.

In 1981, 0MB forced the Office of Radiation

Programs to eliminate 27 positions and stifled work on radon.
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EPA appealed to OMB, citing the potential lung cancer risk
estimate of up to 20,000 radon-caused deaths per year, but
the edict remained.

Since then, EPA staff who are concerned
7

and want to work on the radon problem have "become beggars."

OMB continues to oppose further federal government
involvement with indoor air research or regulation.

Probable

reasons cited by EPA officials are the fear of getting into
another federal regulatory program; apprehension that
research will reveal serious, widespread health risks and,
most obviously, budget constraints.

g

In report language, the

Congress and Appropriations committee asked that EPA, in
conjunction with CIAQ, prepare and submit a strategy document
to

Congress

by January 1,

1985.

It

was submitted in
Q
December, 1984, but did not clear OMB until late spring.
Lloyd Criticizes
Larry Lloyd was highly critical of certain aspects of
the five year plan.

He accused the Office of Radiation

Program of "reinventing the wheel."

10

In a letter to Chuck

Hardin, Executive Secretary of the Conference of Radiation
Control Program Directors, Lloyd said the overall program had
merit, but there was little thought in coordinating its
research with "other agencies that have already conducted a
substantial amount of the work proposed by EPA."

Lloyd also

strongly criticized the

cited

"Development

proposal objective

as

of measurement protocols using existing

instruments," since that was the purpose of the Butte study
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and, according to Lloyd, EPA had not followed up with
assembling and assessing the data and issuing a report as
provided for in the contract.
that EPA was

not moving on

But Lloyd was most incensed
research

"to

demonstrate

effective, low-cost preventative and remedial techniques for
the reduction of radon concentrations in structures."

He

strongly felt that "we should have solutions in hand before
looking for more problems."

i i

On January 18, 1985, Lloyd came out with a blast in
the Montana Standard saying he planned "to continue pushing
for funding

to rid homes in Butte of deadly radon gas."

Lloyd said he planned to push for the remedial demonstration
program at the winter business meeting of the Conference of
Radiation Control Directors in February and with Montana's
Congressional delegation.

Although he supports a national

radon survey, Lloyd argued that, "We must conduct remediation
demonstrations before we go out and find more problems.
don't want to find more
solutions to them."

problems unless we have

We

some

12

Jim Christopulos, HUD's representative to the Radon
Interagency

Radon Working Group, is of the same strong

opinion.

He, too, believes a national assessment

necessary.

But, even more, after 41 years at HUD, he says he

is not going to leave until he sees two things through.
is

completion

is

One

of a remediation demonstration for new

construction in Florida

and
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the

other

is

getting

a

remediation demonstration program off the ground for existing
housing

in

Butte

Pennsylvania.

and

the

high

radiation

area

of

13

Mitigation Project Beginning
As a result of the $2 million appropriated by Congress
for indoor air research for federal fiscal year 1985, EPA has
begun the first stage of a low-cost radon mitigation project.
It is a three-year, $600,000 project and will be dependent
upon additional appropriations by Congress.

The objective is

to demonstrate low-cost retrofit and new construction
techniques that will be used to provide guidance primarily to
builders, building code officials and homeowners/occupants.
The effectiveness of these techniques would be demonstrated
in a series of field programs which would be installed and
performance-tested in representative numbers and types of new
and existing homes.

"Low-cost" would be an installed cost to

a homeowner less than two percent of the market value of his
house plus low cost operation and maintenance.

14

The program plan for the project is nearing the end of
the

first

draft

stage.

The Project

Officer,

John

Ruppersberger , envisions the first site project will be
underway by summer or early fall of 1 985.

This will be in

the Reading Prong area of Eastern Pennsylvania where indoor
radon levels have been tested up to 0.23 WL.
planned for eighteen demonstration units.
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15

This project is

According to Ruppersberger, Butte and the Reading
Prong area will share the second stage project, each with
eighteen demonstration units.

16

Differences in the attitudes toward and expertise with
indoor radon within EPA is reflected in the administration of
this project.

Ruppersberger appears to be very concerned

about the problem and committed to the project.

He works for

the Research and Development Division of EPA which, according
to Richard Guimond, Director of the Criteria and Standards
Division of the Office of Radiation Programs, may not have
the interest or technical know how for radon research, yet is
charged with the responsibility for the program.
working

relationship

seems

to

be

in

An informal

place

between

Ruppersberger, Guimond and Tim Krowe, Guimond's Deputy, as
the Office of Radiation has the technical expertise to give
the project more effective but unofficial direction.

17

Also, there are ways that EPA bureaucrats who are
deeply concerned about the public health risks of radon can
work in indirect and roundabout means towards their goals.
Inquiries from Congressional staff can provide information,
other resources and expand the network of other interested
members and staff on the Hill.

For instance, the five year

national assessment and control plan which was circulated to
state radiation control officers was an internal document
which cannot be sent directly to Hill staff, but may reach
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them indirectly through state-Congressional contact - or just
appear in their mail.
Dave Berg, former Director for Indoor Air within the
Research and Development Office of EPA, strongly believes
that total exposure studies should be done with individuals
in an indoor radon environment.

This

could

also

be

incorporated into authorization legislation and Berg has made
himself unofficially available for technical assistance.
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Future Solutions?
But research alone won't solve the problem.

More

precise data on the extent and targeting of the problem, the
exposure levels, epidemiology and control technology is
essential, but only the beginning.

Kirsch recommends that

EPA translate the results of standards to guide individuals,
state and
itself.

local governments

and the federal government

These standards could be used by homeowners

themselves, for building codes or product standards.
Congress could act further and set up a regulatory
framework to deal with indoor air pollution if and when
necessary.

The

reauthorization

Clean
this

Air

Act,

which

is

up

year, could be amended to

specifically cover indoor air.

for
more

Or a separate statute,

structured like the Clean Air Act, might be enacted.

This

makes the federal government responsible for research and
developing standards, but holds the states responsible for
meeting those standards.

If future research reveals more
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critical health risks, Congress could set and regulate
mandatory federal standards which, however, many might find
intrusive and objectionable.
But any of these potential solutions are far in the
future.

Considering the current Congressional preoccupation

with the budget and the federal deficit, coupled with a lack
of support from the Administration, simply continuing the $42
million appropriation for indoor air research for federal
fiscal year 1986 might be a real victory.
In May of 1985, legislation for a modest indoor air
program was being developed for introduction in the U.S.
Senate as a companion bill to one that had been introduced in
the House of

Representatives in April.

Senator George

Mitchell of Maine had been sensitized to the radon risk by
his constituents and he was the prime mover.

The Senate bill

would definitively give EPA authority to conduct a research
program on indoor air quality, would require a report to
Congress within two years summarizing what was known about
the problem, identify needed research and potential actions
needed to mitigate health effects.

$3 million would be

authorized for the research program, only $1 million more
than the modest amount appropriated the past two years.
This bill was still in the discussion stage when the
New York Times broke the front page story on the Reading
Prong on Sunday, May 19.

Senator Mitchell wanted to take

advantage of this publicity edge and the bill was quickly
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introduced on May 23.

Other original cosponsors of the bill

were Robert Stafford of Vermont, Chairman of the Committee on
Public Works and Environment that had jurisdiction over the
bill, and Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, also a
member of the Committee as was Senator Mitchell.^ 9
The next day, on May 24, the New York Times followed
up with, not an emphasis on the introduced legislation, but
on the EPA "inside document" proposal to initiate a major
Federal effort to locate areas throughout the country where
radon may cause risks to public health.

Dr. H. Ward Alter,

president of a company in California that measures buildings
for radon contamination, was quoted as saying the problem was
widespread.

Introduction of the legislation was cited toward

the end of the article saying it would

give the federal

government authority and funds to do research into the
hazards of radon and other indoor air pollution.

But this

story concluded quoting the EPA draft proposal that high
concentrations of radium "May, in fact, occur in

any

20
structure in the United States."
Whether it be in Butte, the Reading Prong or wherever
else in America, the medical and human costs of possibly up
to 20,000 lung cancer deaths a year from an invisible,
odorless gas in homes, is a public health policy challenge
that should no longer be ignored.
that challenge?
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Will Congress face up to

1

Michael Simpson, I n d o o r A i r Q u a l i t y a n d H e a l t h
Impacts of Energy Conservation, Congressional Research
Service, 3 January 1985, p. 11.
2

"Report of the CIAQ Radon Working Group" (draft)
June, 1984 (photocopied).
3

National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements.
Exposures from the Uranium Series with
Emphasis on Radon and its Daughters, 15 March, 1984, p. 92.
4

"Report of the CIAQ Radon Working Group," June,
1984, (photocopied).
5

"Radon Assessment and Control Program EPA", Fall,
1984, p. 5 (photocopied).
^David Berg, Former Director, Indoor Air, EPA,
interview, Washington, D.C., 3 March 1985.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Q

Administrator's Briefing, Indoor Air TEAM, Love
Canal Agenda, Internal EPA document, 12 March 1985
(photocopied).
^ L a r r y Lloyd, telephone interview, Washington, D.C.
to Helena, MT, 14 January 1985.
11

Larry Lloyd, chief, Occupational Health Bureau,
Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences to
Chuck Hardin, Executive Secretary, Conference of Radiation
Control Directors, Inc., October 22, 1984.
12

"Butte's Radon Problems
Montana Standard, 18 January, 1985.

Not

Forgotten,"

13

Jim Christopulos, Washington, D.C. interview, 24
January, 1985.
14

John Ruppensberger, EPA Project Control Officer,
te l e p h o n e i n t e r v i e w , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . t o T r i a n g l e P a r k ,
North Carolina interview, 2 February 1985.
1 5 Ibid.
1 6 Ibid.

17

Richard Guimond, Director, Criteria and Standards
Division, Office of Radiation Programs, EPA, interview, 4
March 1985.
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18

David Berg, interview, 3 March 1985.

19

"Radioactive Gas in Soil Raises Concern in ThreeState Area," New York Times, 24 May 1985.
20

"Effort Is Urged to Cut Risk from Radioactive Gas,"
New York Times, 24 May 1985.
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